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THE	term	‘epistemology’	did	not	come	into	common	use	in	English	until	the	mid	nineteenth	century	when	Scottish
philosopher	James	Ferrier	described	it	as	the	science	that	answers	the	general	question	‘What	is	Knowing	and	the
Known?’	or	more	succinctly	‘What	is	Knowledge?’	(Ferrier	1875:	48–9).	What	philosophers	have	come	to	call
epistemology	since	the	time	of	Ferrier	was	studied	in	eighteenth-century	Britain	under	the	title	of	‘human
understanding’,	or	sometimes	simply	‘the	understanding’.	For	some	thinkers	of	the	day	‘the	understanding’	was
limited	to	the	faculty	which	produced	absolute	knowledge.	However,	for	most,	following	Locke,	the	study	of	the
faculty	of	understanding	included	not	only	knowledge	itself,	but	also	the	pre-conditions	for	knowledge	including	the
operations	of	the	senses	and	the	mind	which	make	it	possible. 	More	significantly,	it	often	embraced	the	study	of
the	nature	of	belief	or	opinion	and	even	principles	of	reasoning	that	led	to	error.	It	was	in	part	normative,	but	it	also
included	a	study	of	the	facts	about	human	cognition	which	are	now	studied	by	cognitive	scientists.
Looking	back	at	his	eighteenth-century	predecessors	in	his	Elements	of	the	Philosophy	of	the	Human	Mind	in
1814,	Dugald	Stewart	complained	about	‘the	vagueness	and	indistinctness’	of	the	term	‘Understanding’,	as	well	as
related	terms	such	as	reason	and	judgment	(Stewart	1792–1827:	Vol.	2,	14–15).	He	objected	in	particular	to	the
use	of	the	term	understanding	to	include	‘Imagination,	Memory,	and	Perception’.	While	acknowledging	that	there	is
some	rationale	for	this	usage	because	these	latter	powers	are	‘all	subservient	in	one	way	or	another	to	the	right
exercise	of	the	Understanding’,	Stewart	proposed	to	use	the	term	understanding	as	synonymous	with	reason.	In
turn,	he	limited	the	term	reason	to	‘the	power	by	which	we	distinguish	truth	from	falsehood’	and	by	which	we
discover	the	means	‘for	the	attainment	of	our	ends’	(Stewart	1792–1827:	Vol.	2,	12).	The	understanding	or	reason
should	be	understood	as	the	faculty	by	which	we	obtain	both	theoretical	and	practical	knowledge.
As	shown	in	this	chapter,	the	term	‘understanding’	suffers	from	ambiguity	in	the	most	influential	thinkers	of	the	day,
including	Locke	and	Hume.	The	latter,	for	example,	presented	a	naturalized	notion	of	the	understanding	which
relaxed	the	traditional	demands	of	that	faculty	but,	at	the	same	time,	retained	a	notion	of	the	understanding	which
requires	comprehension	and	insight	into	natural	processes.	It	is	the	conflict	between	the	natural	judgments	of
common	understanding	and	the	demands	of	philosophical	understanding	which	typically	characterizes	Hume’s
scepticism.	There	were,	as	we	shall	see,	two	very	different	responses	to	this	scepticism.	Writers	such	as	Richard
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Price	rejected	the	naturalized	notion	of	the	understanding	and	argued	that	the	objects	of	the	understanding	are
purely	intellectual	ideas	on	which	necessary	truths	are	based.	While	not	entirely	rejecting	that	approach,	Thomas
Reid	and	other	writers	of	the	Scottish	School	of	Common	Sense	relaxed	the	demand	that	all	the	first	principles	of
the	understanding	must	be	based	on	necessary	truths.	They	‘refuted’	Humean	scepticism	by	arguing	that	the
natural	judgments	of	common	life	are	not	in	conflict	with	philosophical	understanding.
7.1	The	Understanding	and	the	Will
In	his	Essay	Concerning	Human	Understanding,	Locke	identified	‘Perception,	or	Thinking’	and	‘Volition,	or	Willing’
as	‘the	two	great	and	principal	Actions	of	the	Mind’—and	‘the	Understanding’	and	‘the	Will’	respectively	as	the
faculties	or	powers	which	perform	these	actions	(Locke	1975:	II.vi.2).	The	will,	for	Locke,	is	defined	as	the	source	of
voluntary	actions:	it	is	the	power	to	perform	or	refrain	from	performing	an	action,	according	to	an	‘order	or
command	of	the	mind’	(Locke	1975:	II.xxi.5).	However,	this	‘command	of	the	mind’	itself	often	appears	to	be	the
product	of	the	understanding.	In	the	Essay	he	wrote	that	‘Man	is	put	under	a	necessity	by	his	constitution,	as	an
intelligent	Being,	to	be	determined	in	willing	by	his	own	Thought	and	Judgment,	what	is	best	for	him	to	do’	(Locke
1975:	II.xxi.48).	Similarly,	he	begins	his	posthumously	published	Conduct	of	the	Understanding	with	the	claim	that
all	voluntary	action	depends	‘upon	some	precedent	knowledge	or	appearance	of	knowledge	in	the	understanding’
and	that	‘the	will	itself,	how	absolute	and	uncontrollable	so	ever	it	be	thought,	never	fails	in	its	obedience	to	the
dictates	of	the	understanding’	(Locke	1823:	205).	At	the	same	time,	he	recognized	that	human	beings	were
capable	of	akrasia,	of	understanding	the	good	without	acting	on	it.	In	his	revised	account	‘Of	Power’	in	the	second
edition	of	the	Essay,	he	wrote	that	he	was	‘forced	to	conclude,	that…	the	greater	good,	though	apprehended	and
acknowledged	to	be	so,	does	not	determine	the	will,	until	our	desire,	raised	proportionately	to	it,	makes	us	uneasy
in	the	want	of	it’	(Locke	1975:	II.xxxv.35).	This	passage	suggests	the	sovereignty	of	the	will	over	the	understanding
—at	least,	in	determining	our	outward	actions.
In	the	eighteenth	century,	Locke’s	conception	of	judgment	was	sometimes	contrasted	with	that	of	the	Cartesians,
who	held	that	judgment	is	a	product	of	the	will,	and	that	the	only	operation	of	the	understanding	is	to	perceive.	For
example,	in	the	article	on	‘Understanding’	in	Ephraim	Chambers’	1728	Cyclopedia	the	distinction	between	the	two
philosophies	was	expressed	as	follows:	for	Locke	and	‘the	Corpuscularians,	the	Understanding	has	two	Offices,
viz.	Perception,	and	Judgment;	according	to	the	Cartesians	only	one,	viz.	Perception’	(Chambers	1728:	Vol.	2,
323).	In	his	article	on	‘Judgment’	Chambers	supported	the	Cartesian	view	that	judgment	is	always	based	on	a	free
act	of	the	will—even	in	the	case	where	‘we	consent	to	the	truth…when	it	appears	perfectly	evident’.	In	his	Essay
towards	the	theory	of	the	ideal	or	intelligible	world	(1701),	John	Norris	had	written	that	‘Judgment…seems	rather
to	belong	to	the	Will,	than	to	the	Understanding,	as	being	nothing	else	but	that	assent	or	dissent	which	the	Will
gives	to	what	the	Understanding	perceives,	or	seems	to	perceive’	(Norris	1701:	Vol.	2,	126).	Following
Malebranche,	Norris	had	argued	that	the	understanding	is	purely	passive,	even	in	the	operations	of	reason
(Malebranche	1997:	3).	The	proper	function	of	the	will	is	to	withhold	assent	until	one	has	clear	and	distinct	ideas,
and	even	then	the	act	of	assent	is	ascribed	to	the	free	action	of	the	will	(cf.	Descartes	1985–91:	Vol.	2,	40).	Error
arises	simply	from	the	will	assenting	to	that	for	which	it	lacks	evidence.
In	fact,	there	seems	to	be	little	more	than	a	verbal	difference	between	the	views	of	Locke	and	the	Cartesians	on	the
relation	of	the	will	to	the	understanding. 	Locke	shared	the	Cartesian	view	that	we	are	responsible	for	error,	and
that	we	should	not	assent	to	a	proposition	until	the	evidence	in	its	favour	is	overwhelming.	He	wrote	that	‘we	can
hinder	both	Knowledge	and	Assent,	by	stopping	our	Enquiry,	and	not	imploying	our	Faculties	in	the	search	for	any
Truth.	If	it	were	not	so,	Ignorance,	Error,	or	Infidelity	could	not	in	any	case	be	a	Fault’	(Locke	1975:	IV.xx.16).	Our
laziness	and	failure	to	make	a	true	judgment	in	such	cases	seems	to	be	a	function	of	the	will.	Further,	Locke
supplemented	the	Cartesian	view	that	when	our	understanding	apprehends	clear	and	distinct	ideas	we	are
determined	to	assent,	with	the	claim	that	overwhelming	probabilities	also	command	our	assent.	In	cases	such	as
those	concerning	the	events	of	the	life	and	death	of	Julius	Caesar,	the	evidence	‘naturally	determines	the
Judgment,	and	leaves	us	as	little	liberty	to	believe,	or	disbelieve,	as	a	Demonstration	does…’	(Locke	1975:
IV.xvi.9).	For	Locke	overwhelming	evidence	leaves	us	without	liberty,	whereas	for	the	Cartesians	our	assent	in
such	cases	is	the	height	of	human	freedom—but	a	freedom	in	which	we	are	determined	by	our	own	rational
nature.
The	distinction	between	the	understanding	and	the	will	had	a	very	different	significance	in	the	philosophy	of	David
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Hume	than	in	that	of	Locke	and	the	Cartesians.	He	appealed	to	this	distinction	in	defending	the	importance	of	what
he	called	‘mental	geography’	in	the	first	section	of	his	Philosophical	Essays	concerning	Human	Understanding
(2000	[1748]:	10). 	However,	in	going	on	to	explain	its	usefulness	he	did	not	stress	the	importance	of	withholding
one’s	belief	from	what	lacks	evidence,	as	did	Locke	and	Norris.	Rather	he	contrasted	the	judgments	of	the
understanding	with	those	of	our	affections	or	feelings.	In	support	of	the	distinction,	Hume	cited	the	claim	of	Francis
Hutcheson	that	‘moral	perceptions…ought	not	to	be	clas’d	with	the	Operations	of	the	Understanding,	but	with	the
Tastes,	or	Sentiments’. 	Following	Hutcheson,	Hume	argued	that	the	understanding—taken	as	the	faculty	which
determines	truth	and	falsity—plays	a	subsidiary	role	to	feelings	in	bringing	about	actions	(Hume	1978:	413–18).	For
Hume,	unlike	Locke,	the	pronouncements	of	the	understanding	are	not	normative.
Thomas	Reid	criticized	the	general	division	of	the	mind	into	the	faculties	of	understanding	and	the	will	on	the
ground	that	the	understanding	itself	is	always	active	and	that	‘the	will	must	have	an	object,	and	that	object	must	be
apprehended	or	conceived	in	the	understanding’	(Reid	2002:	64–5).	He	wrote	that	‘there	is	no	operation	of	the
understanding	wherein	the	mind	is	not	active	in	some	degree’.	For	him	the	understanding	takes	in	all	our
contemplative	powers—those	by	which	‘we	perceive	objects;	by	which	we	conceive	or	remember	them;	by	which
we	analyze	or	compound	them;	and	by	which	we	judge	and	reason	concerning	them’.	Reid	stresses	that
perception	of	external	objects	involves	an	activity	on	the	part	of	the	understanding	in	judging	their	properties	and
existence.	In	the	final	analysis,	he	wrote	that	both	the	will	and	the	understanding	concur	in	all	operations	of	the
mind,	and	that	he	classifies	any	mental	operation	‘under	that	faculty	which	hath	the	largest	share	in	it’.
7.2	The	Traditional	Division	of	the	Acts	of	the	Understanding,	and	Its	Critics
Logic	texts	in	Britain	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries	generally	adopted	the	traditional	distinction	of
three	acts	of	the	understanding:	(1)	conception	or	simple	apprehension,	(2)	judgment,	and	(3)	discourse	or
reasoning.	Sometimes,	following	the	division	in	the	Port	Royal	Logic,	a	fourth—‘method’	or	ordering	of	judgments—
was	added	(see	Arnauld	and	Nicole	1996:	227–75).
The	first	act	of	the	understanding,	conception	or	simple	apprehension,	is	non-propositional:	it	does	not	put	forward
any	claim	which	is	true	or	false.	In	explaining	simple	apprehension	in	his	Logick:	or	the	right	Use	of	Reason	in	the
Enquiry	after	Truth,	Isaac	Watts	noted	that	we	can	think	of	things	without	‘affirming	or	denying	any	Thing
concerning	them’	(Watts	1725:	6–7).	The	act	of	simple	apprehension	is	‘Perception	or	Conception’	(Watts	1725:
11).	We	perceive	both	external	and	internal	objects	via	ideas.	An	idea	is	‘the	Thing	as	it	exists	in	the	Mind,	by
way	of	Conception	or	Representation’	(Watts	1725:	13).	He	writes	further	that	an	idea	is	‘a	Representation	of
something	that	we	have	seen,	felt,	heard,	&c.	or	been	conscious	of’.	He	goes	on	to	discuss	both	simple	and
complex	ideas,	arguing	that	our	ideas	of	both	substances	and	modes	which	are	formed	by	the	imagination	are	also
objects	of	simple	apprehension.	Again,	the	key	to	the	notion	of	simple	apprehension	is	that	it	involves	a	non-
propositional	awareness.
Writing	much	later	in	the	century,	Edward	Bentham	states	in	his	Introduction	to	Logick,	Scholastik	and	Rational
that	‘the	operations	of	the	understanding…are	reducible	to	these	three,	Simple	Apprehension,	Judgment,	and
Reasoning’	(Bentham	1773:	2–3).	Like	Watts,	he	characterizes	the	first	operation	as	non-propositional:	‘when	we
barely	contemplate	any	thing,	as	a	book,	house,	man,	&c.	whether	absent	or	present,	without	determining	any
thing	concerning	it,	we	are	simply	said	to	apprehend’.	Also,	like	Watts,	Bentham	considers	the	act	of	simple
apprehension	to	be	perception.	Perception	of	material	objects	takes	place	via	representative	ideas.	He
characterizes	an	idea	as	‘the	form,	under	which	a	thing	is	represented	within	the	mind’.	Both	sensation	and
imagination	were,	for	Bentham,	acts	of	simple	apprehension.	He	wrote	that	when	perception	is	accompanied	by
and	‘annexed	to	any	impression	on	the	body	made	by	an	external	object,	[it]	is	called	Sensation’	and	‘when	ideas
recur	without	the	operation	of	objects	on	the	external	sensory,	especially	if	under	the	choice	and	conduct	of	the
Understanding,	it	is	called	Imagination’.	Bentham	also	includes	under	simple	apprehension	two	more	actions	of	the
Understanding,	namely	consciousness	and	intellect.	The	first	involves	the	perception	of	the	operations	of	the	mind
itself	and	the	pleasures	and	pains	which	accompany	them	(what	Locke	called	‘reflection’)	and	the	second,	the
perception	of	purely	intellectual	objects	without	any	image.	He	gives	as	examples	of	purely	intellectual	perception,
ideas	such	‘as	God,	Justice,	Virtue,	Reason’.
The	second	act	of	the	understanding,	according	to	the	traditional	account,	is	judgment.	Isaac	Watts	defines	it	as
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‘that	Operation	of	the	Mind,	whereby	we	join	two	or	more	Ideas	together	by	one	Affirmation	or	Negation,	that	is,	we
either	affirm	or	deny	this	to	be	that’	(Watts	1725:	7).	He	opposes	those	who	consider	judgment	to	consist	‘in	a	meer
Perception	of	the	Agreement	or	Disagreement	of	Ideas’,	insisting	that	beyond	perception	itself	judgment	involves	an
act	of	will	(Watts	1725:	222).	Watts	argues	that	we	can	perceive,	or	at	least	think	we	perceive	an	agreement	or
disagreement	of	ideas	without	making	a	judgment,	and	that	we	can	make	a	judgment	without	any	clear	perception.
For	judgment	to	take	place	we	must	acquiesce	in	what	we	perceive.	Despite	the	necessity	of	an	act	of	will,	Watts
classifies	judgment	among	the	acts	of	the	understanding.	He	writes	that	when	a	judgment	is	‘clothed	with	Words,
’tis	called	a	Proposition,	even	though	it	be	in	the	Mind	only,	as	well	as	when	it	is	exprest	by	speaking	or	writing’
(Watts	1725:	224–5).
For	Bentham,	judgment	is	‘acknowledgment’	of	‘an	agreement	or	disagreement	between	one	thing	and	another’.
This	acknowledgment	is	done	‘by	Affirmation	or	Denial’	(Bentham	1773:	3–4).	Bentham	says	that	he	uses	the	word
‘acknowledge’	rather	than	‘perceive’	here	because	in	many	cases	of	judgment	we	don’t	actually	perceive	the
agreement	or	disagreement	of	ideas,	but	acknowledge	it	on	the	basis	of	the	authority	of	a	reliable	witness	(Bentham
1773:	35).	In	this	he	is	influenced	by	Locke,	who	contrasted	judgment	with	knowledge—that	is,	the	perception	of
the	agreement	or	disagreement	of	ideas.	Indeed,	for	Locke,	judgment	is	defined	as	‘the	putting	Ideas	together,	or
separating	them	from	one	another…when	their	Agreement	or	Disagreement	is	not	perceived,	but	presumed	to	be
so’	(Locke	1975:	IV.xiv.4).
The	third	act	of	the	understanding,	‘Argumentation	or	Reasoning’	is	defined	by	Watts	as	‘that	Operation	of	the	Mind,
whereby	we	infer	one	Thing,	or	one	Proposition,	from	two	or	more	Propositions	premised’	(Watts	1725:	7).	He
appeals	to	the	notion	of	a	‘Medium’	or	intermediate	idea	which	was	central	to	the	notion	of	reasoning	for	Descartes,
Locke	and	other	modern	philosophers.	Watts	writes	that	‘when	we	are	unable	to	judge	the	Truth	or	Falshood	of	a
Proposition	in	an	immediate	Manner,	by	the	mere	Contemplation	of	its	Subject	and	Predicate,	we	are	then
constrain’d	to	use	a	Medium,	and	to	compare	each	of	them	with	some	third	Idea…’	(Watts	1725:	423).	He	then
goes	on	to	give	a	standard	account	of	syllogistic	logic.	One	finds	a	similar	account	in	Bentham,	though	he	begins
with	a	more	informal	conception	of	reasoning.	He	characterizes	it	as	determining	the	truth	or	falsity	of	a	proposition
‘by	observing	its	agreement	or	disagreement	with	some	other,	whose	truth	we	acknowledge	already’	(Bentham
1773:	4).	He	then	lays	out	a	standard	account	of	syllogistic	reasoning.
These	three	constitute	the	acts	of	the	understanding	discussed	in	Bentham’s	Logick	and	many	other	logic
textbooks	of	the	time;	but,	following	Arnauld	and	Nicole,	Watts	adds	a	fourth	act	which	he	calls	‘the	Art	of	Method’
(Watts	1725:	506). 	It	concerns	‘the	Operation	of	the	Mind,	whereby	we	put	the	Ideas,	Propositions,	and
Arguments…into	such	an	Order	as	is	fittest	to	gain	the	clearest	Knowledge	of	it,	to	retain	it	longest,	and	to	explain	it
to	others	in	the	best	Manner’	(Watts	1725:	8–9).
While,	as	the	text	of	Edward	Bentham	shows	us,	the	traditional	distinction	of	the	three	acts	of	the	understanding	did
not	disappear	from	logic	textbooks,	it	was	generally	disregarded	or	criticized	by	British	philosophers	throughout	the
eighteenth	century.	Locke	replaced	it	with	his	own	trilogy	in	his	Essay	Concerning	Human	Understanding.	He	wrote
that	‘Perception,	which	we	make	the	act	of	the	Understanding,	is	of	three	sorts:	1.	The	Perception	of	Ideas	in	our
Minds.	2.	The	Perception	of	the	signification	of	Signs.	3.	The	Perception	of	the	Connexion	or	Repugnancy,
Agreement	or	Disagreement,	that	there	is	between	any	of	our	Ideas’	(Locke	1975:	II.xxi.5).	Locke’s	division	of	acts
of	the	understanding	roughly	follows	the	division	of	‘books’	in	the	Essay	itself:	The	first	two	books	are	ostensibly
concerned	with	the	origin	of	our	ideas	(#1);	the	third	book	discusses	language	and	the	signification	of	words	(#2);
and	the	fourth	book	is	concerned	with	knowledge	and	opinion	(#3).
As	much	as	this	division	differs	from	the	traditional	one,	it	is	still	important	to	recognize	that	Locke	retains	the
essence	of	the	traditional	distinction	between	‘simple	apprehension’	and	judgment.	Like	‘simple	apprehension’,
Locke’s	first	act	of	the	understanding,	the	‘Perception	of	Ideas	in	our	Minds’,	is	not	propositional.	For	this	reason,
one	must	be	cautious	in	applying	the	term	‘empiricist’	to	his	philosophy:	he	does	not,	like	Gassendi,	hold	a	crude
empiricism	which	conflates	‘the	acquisition	of	principles	with	the	acquisition	of	concepts’	(see	Ayers	1998:	1023;
and	Woolhouse	1994:	esp.	149).	Knowledge,	which	is	propositional	for	Locke,	is	a	distinct	act	of	the	understanding
which	goes	beyond	simple	apprehension.	It	is	‘the	perception	of	the	connexion	and	agreement,	or	disagreement
and	repugnancy	of	any	of	our	Ideas’	(Locke	1975:	IV.i.2).	Even	the	knowledge	of	‘actual	real	Existence	agreeing
to	any	Idea’,	which	barely	fits	this	formula,	takes	us	beyond	the	bare	idea	to	the	judgment	that	the	idea	is	derived
from	an	independent	object	(Locke	1975:	IV.i.7;	and	esp.	IV.xi.3).
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The	Malebranchist	view,	which	reduced	judgment	and	reasoning	to	the	perception	of	relations,	was	set	out	in	the
article	on	‘judgment’	in	Chambers’s	Cyclopaedia.	Chambers	wrote	that
The	only	Difference,	then,	between	Perception,	Judgment,	and	Reasoning,	so	far	as	the	Understanding	is
concerned	in	them	is	this,	That	it	perceives	a	thing	simply,	without	any	relation	to	any	other	thing	in	a
simple	Perception,	that	it	perceives	the	Relations	between	two	or	more	things	in	Judgments,	and	lastly	that
it	perceives	the	Relations	that	are	between	the	Relations	of	things	in	Reasonings:	So	that	all	the	Operations
of	the	Understanding	are	in	effect	no	more	than	pure	Perceptions.	(Chambers	1728:	Vol.	2,	409)
In	his	Essay	towards	the	Theory	of	the	Ideal	or	Intelligible	World,	John	Norris	also	stressed	that	while	the	objects
of	the	understanding	may	be	complex	in	so	far	as	they	involve	the	relations	of	ideas,	the	act	of	the	understanding
is	always	a	‘simple	Apprehension’	(Norris	1701:	Vol.	2,	141–3).	In	his	Treatise	of	Human	Nature,	David	Hume	also
reduced	the	three	traditional	acts	of	the	understanding	to	simple	apprehension.	He	wrote	that
these	three	acts	of	the	understanding…taking	them	in	a	proper	light…all	resolve	themselves	into	the	first,
and	are	nothing	but	particular	ways	of	conceiving	our	objects.	Whether	we	consider	a	single	object,	or
several;	whether	we	dwell	on	these	objects	or	run	from	them	to	others;	and	in	whatever	form	or	order	we
survey	them,	the	act	of	the	mind	exceeds	not	a	simple	conception.	(Hume	1978:	96–7)
Hume	argues	that	judgment	does	not	necessarily	involve	the	perception	of	the	relation	of	two	ideas:	since
‘existence’	is	not	a	separate	idea,	a	judgment	concerning	the	existence	of	a	thing,	such	as	‘God	is’,	does	not
contain	more	than	one	idea	(cf.	Hume	1978:	66–8).	Moreover,	according	to	Hume’s	own	theory	of	inductive
reasoning,	‘we	infer	a	cause	immediately	from	its	effect’.	We	do	not	require	an	‘intermediate	idea’	and	such
reasoning	cannot	be	put	in	syllogistic	form.	While,	like	the	Cartesians,	Hume	reduced	all	the	acts	of	the
understanding	to	simple	perception,	he	did	not	share	their	view	that	judgment	involves	an	act	of	free	will	in	which
we	assent	to	or	dissent	from	what	we	perceive.	Quite	the	contrary,	he	argued	for	a	naturalistic	theory	of	the
understanding	in	which	these	operations	arise	from	the	mechanical	processes	of	the	imagination.
7.3	Naturalizing	the	Understanding:	Natural	Judgments	and	Inferences
The	paradigm	of	simple	apprehension	for	many	writers	of	logic	textbooks	was	the	operation	of	sensation.	Locke
himself	stressed	its	passivity,	and	considered	the	simple	sensations	or	ideas	which	it	produces	to	be	indestructible
mental	atoms.	He	held	that	the	‘materials	of	Knowledge’	are	not	in	the	power	of	the	mind	to	change,	and	that	in
sensation	‘the	Understanding	is	merely	passive’	(Locke	1975:	II.i.25).
At	the	same	time,	Locke	held	that	visual	perception	of	external	objects	is	complex	and	that	judgment	enters
unconsciously	into	what	we	see.	We	judge	that	we	are	seeing	three-dimensional	objects,	when	all	that	actually
appears	to	our	senses	is	a	two-dimensional	surface	with	varied	shadow	and	colour.	Locke	wrote	that	‘the	Ideas	we
receive	by	Sensation,	are	often	in	grown	People	alter’d	by	the	Judgment,	without	our	taking	notice	of	it’	(Locke
1975:	II.ix.8). 	This	judgment	is	the	result	of	‘an	habitual	custom’	which	‘alters	the	Appearances	into	their	Causes’.
His	explanation	of	the	fact	that	we	are	not	aware	of	making	such	a	judgment	is	that	the	action	of	judging	has
become	so	quick	from	habit	that	we	cannot	attend	to	it:	‘a	settled	habit,	in	things	whereof	we	have	frequent
experience,	is	performed	so	constantly,	and	so	quick,	that	we	take	that	for	the	Perception	of	our	Sensation,	which
is	an	Idea	formed	by	our	Judgment’	(Locke	1975:	II.ix.9).
It	is	not	clear	whether	Locke	intended	to	ascribe	this	habitual	judgment	to	the	understanding	or	to	some	other
faculty	of	the	mind.	Certainly	he	did	not	think	that	there	is	any	weighing	of	evidence	in	these	cases,	as	is	required
to	make	a	reasoned	judgment.	Elsewhere	he	contrasts	the	‘natural	Correspondence	and	Connexion’	of	our	ideas
which	it	is	‘the	Office	and	Excellency	of	our	Reason	to	trace’	with	those	connections	between	our	ideas	‘wholly
owing	to	Chance	or	Custom’	(Locke	1975:	II.xxxiii.5).	At	the	same	time,	he	writes	of	custom	as	settling	‘habits	of
Thinking	in	the	Understanding,	as	well	as	of	Determining	in	the	Will,	and	of	Motions	in	the	Body’	(Locke	1975:
II.xxxiii.6).	For	Locke,	even	irrational	judgments	based	merely	on	custom	and	habit	are	fixed	‘in	the	Understanding’.
Locke’s	example	of	naturalized	perceptual	judgment	in	the	Essay	was	of	the	visual	perception	of	three-dimensional
shape;	however	his	analysis	had	clear	implications	for	our	seeing	of	distance,	size,	and	position—implications
which	were	discussed	at	length	in	Berkeley’s	Essay	Towards	a	New	Theory	of	Vision.	Berkeley	argued	explicitly
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against	the	‘natural	geometry’	which	Descartes	had	postulated	in	his	Optics	(Berkeley	1948:	175	(§19);	cf.
Descartes	1985–91:	Vol.	1,	170).	Descartes	had	argued	that	we	determine	the	distance	of	nearby	objects	from	our
eyes	through	‘a	quite	simple	act	of	the	imagination’	which	‘involves	a	kind	of	reasoning	quite	similar	to	that	used	by
surveyors’.	He	held	that	the	mind	makes	a	calculation	based	on	the	distance	between	our	two	eyes	and	the	size	of
the	angle	formed	by	focusing	them	on	a	single	point	on	the	object.	Berkeley	criticized	Descartes’	account	of
distance	perception	on	the	ground	that	it	is	‘incomprehensible’	that	we	could	‘make	those	judgments,	and	draw
those	conclusions’	without	knowing	that	we	do	so	(Berkeley	1948:	175	(§19)).	Moreover,	he	argued	that	there	is	no
‘necessary	connection’	between	the	visual	datum	we	use	to	perceive	the	distance	of	nearby	objects	and	the
distance	itself,	as	Descartes	had	thought	(Berkeley	1948:	176	(§24)).	Rather	the	judgment	we	make	of	the	distance
of	nearby	objects	is	based	on	‘constant	experience’	which	has	‘found	the	different	sensations	corresponding	to
the	different	dispositions	of	the	eyes	to	be	attended	each	with	a	different	…	distance	in	the	object’	(Berkeley	1948:
174	(§17)).	As	a	result	the	repeated	experience,	a	‘habitual	or	customary	connexion’	has	been	formed	‘between
those	two	sorts	of	ideas,	so	that	the	mind	no	sooner	perceives	the	sensation	arising	from	the	different	turn	it	gives
to	the	eyes’	than	it	perceives	the’	idea	of	distance’	which	has	become	associated	with	it.	As	Berkeley’s	argument
develops	it	becomes	clear	that	the	‘idea	of	distance’	is	based	on	sensations	of	touch	including	kinaesthetic
sensations;	the	customary	connection	to	which	he	refers	is	between	visual	signs	and	the	ideas	of	distance
experienced	through	the	sense	of	touch	(Berkeley	1949:	58–9	(§44)).
As	with	Locke,	there	is	some	ambiguity	in	Berkeley’s	writings	as	to	whether	the	habitual	judgment	is	to	be	ascribed
to	the	understanding	or	not.	In	the	New	Theory	of	Vision	Berkeley	likened	this	judgment	of	distance	to	the	process
whereby	‘upon	hearing	a	certain	sound,	the	idea	[of	its	meaning]	is	immediately	suggested	to	the	understanding
which	custom	had	united	to	it’	(Berkeley	1948:	174	(§17),	my	emphasis).	However,	in	his	later	Theory	of	Vision
Vindicated	he	attributed	the	judgment	of	distance	via	sight	to	the	imagination	rather	than	the	understanding.	He
writes	that	‘things	not	actually	perceived	by	sense	are	signified	or	suggested	to	the	imagination,	whose	objects
they	are,	and	which	alone	perceives	them’	(Berkeley	1948:	264	(§39;	see	also	§§50–2)).	‘To	be	suggested	is	one
thing,	and	to	be	inferred	is	another’	(Berkeley	1948:	265	(§42)).	Only	necessary	‘judgments	and	inferences’	are
made	‘by	the	understanding’.
A	similar	ambiguity	pervades	the	discussion	of	natural	judgments	and	inferences	in	Hume’s	Treatise	of	Human
Nature.	When	he	formulated	what	has	become	known	as	the	problem	of	induction,	Hume	did	so	by	drawing	a
contrast	between	the	operations	of	the	understanding	and	those	of	imagination.	He	raised	the	question	‘whether
experience	produces	the	idea	by	means	of	the	understanding	or	of	the	imagination;	whether	we	are	determin’d	by
reason	to	make	the	transition,	or	by	a	certain	association	and	relation	of	perceptions’	(Hume	1978:	88–9).
Understanding	is	here	identified	with	reason,	and	the	imagination	with	the	faculty	which	associates	ideas.	He
writes	that	‘even	after	experience	has	inform’d	us	of	their	constant	conjunction,	’tis	impossible	for	us	to	satisfy
ourselves	by	our	reason,	why	we	shou’d	extend	that	experience	beyond	those	particular	instances,	which	have
fallen	under	our	observation’	(Hume	1978:	91).	By	‘reason’	in	this	context	he	means	the	faculty	which	compares
ideas	and	determines	the	relations	between	them. 	While	the	understanding	or	reason	is	able	to	ascertain	the
contiguity,	succession,	and	constant	conjunction	of	the	objects	we	call	cause	and	effect	in	past	experience,	it	is
unable	to	discover	the	power	or	necessary	connection	by	which	the	one	produces	the	other.	Hume	concludes	that
if	the	ideas	of	cause	and	effect	had	‘no	more	union	in	the	fancy	[i.e.	the	imagination]	than	objects	seem	to	have	in
the	understanding,	we	could	never	draw	any	inference	from	causes	to	effects,	nor	repose	belief	in	any	matter	of
fact’	(Hume	1978:	92;	emphasis	added).
Having	denied	that	the	understanding	or	reason	is	the	source	of	our	inductive	inferences,	Hume	attributes	them	to
the	imagination	or	to	‘custom	or	a	principle	of	association’	(Hume	1978:	97).	In	the	Treatise	he	wrote	that	we
ascribe	this	operation	of	the	mind	‘to	CUSTOM,	which	proceeds	from	a	past	repetition,	without	any	new	reasoning
or	conclusion’	(Hume	1978:	102).	As	we	shall	see	in	a	moment,	in	his	first	Enquiry	he	is	even	more	explicit	in
defining	custom	as	a	principle	which	is	independent	of	the	operations	of	reason	and	the	understanding.
Nevertheless,	in	the	Treatise	Hume	went	on	to	attribute	the	actions	of	imagination	and	custom	themselves	to	the
understanding.	Without	renouncing	his	earlier	contrast	between	the	understanding	and	imagination,	he	went	on	to
consider	the	understanding—what	we	may	now	call	naturalized	understanding—as	a	function	of	the	imagination
and	the	association	of	ideas. 	He	writes	that	‘the	understanding	or	imagination	can	draw	inferences	from	past
experience,	without	reflecting	on	it;	much	more	without	forming	any	principle	concerning	it,	or	reasoning	upon	that
principle’	(Hume	1978:	104).	In	this	passage,	far	from	being	contrasted	with	the	imagination,	the	understanding	is
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contrasted	with	reasoning.	Again,	in	the	Conclusion	to	Book	1	he	identifies	‘the	understanding’	with	‘the	general
and	more	establish’d	properties	of	the	imagination’	(Hume	1978:	267).	It	is	the	imagination	or	the	association	of
ideas	which	causes	us	to	infer	the	idea	of	the	effect	from	the	impression	of	its	cause,	and	enlivens	that	idea	so	that
we	believe	in	the	existence	of	its	object.	Belief	in	real	existence	is	founded	on	the	vivacity	of	an	idea.	Thus,	Hume
writes	that	‘the	memory,	senses,	and	understanding	are…all	of	them	founded	on	the	imagination	or	the	vivacity	of
ideas’	(Hume	1978:	265).
In	his	Enquiry	Concerning	Human	Understanding	Hume	dropped	those	claims	in	which	he	identified	the
understanding	with	imagination,	and	generally	maintained	a	distinction	between	the	operations	of	reason	(including
probable	reason)	and	the	understanding	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	inferences	caused	by	custom	and	habit	on	the
other.	This	is	surely	one	area	in	which	he	hoped	to	correct	‘some	negligences	in	his	former	reasoning	and	more	in
his	expression’	in	this	rewriting	of	his	earlier	argument.	In	the	famous	Advertisement	which	he	prefaced	to	his	later
philosophical	writings	he	asked	his	readers	to	disregard	the	Treatise	and	regard	his	later	writings	including	the	first
Enquiry	‘as	containing	his	philosophical	sentiments	and	principles’	(Hume	2000:	2).	In	the	first	Enquiry	he	wrote
that	‘in	all	reasonings	from	experience,	there	is	a	step	taken	by	the	mind,	which	is	not	supported	by	any	argument
or	process	of	the	understanding’	(Hume	2000:	36,	emphasis	added)	The	step	is	taken	by	the	mind,	but	not	by	the
understanding.	We	cannot	discover	in	nature	the	principle	which	would	allow	us	to	move	from	past	regularities	to
inferences	about	similar	events	occurring	in	the	future.	To	draw	the	inference	we	require	the	operation	of	custom
or	habit.	Hume	characterizes	custom	or	habit	as	‘a	propensity	to	renew	the	same	act	or	operation,	without	being
impelled	by	any	reasoning	or	process	of	the	understanding’	(Hume	2000:	37,	emphasis	added)	Belief	is	formed
through	‘a	species	of	natural	instincts,	which	no	reasoning	or	process	of	thought	and	understanding	is	able	either
to	produce	or	prevent’	(Hume	2000:	39,	emphasis	added).	Probable	inferences	have	their	source	in	an	‘instinct	or
mechanical	tendency’	which	‘may	be	independent	of	all	the	laboured	deductions	of	the	understanding’	(Hume
2000:	45,	emphasis	added).	In	general,	in	the	first	Enquiry	Hume	is	far	more	careful	in	distinguishing	the	operations
of	the	understanding	from	those	of	custom.	While	he	writes	of	the	‘reason’	which	humans	and	animals	share,	he	is
careful	to	identify	it	as	an	instinct,	and	to	distinguish	its	operations	from	the	more	developed	‘disquisitions	of	human
understanding’	(Hume	2000:	81).
In	his	Inquiry	into	the	Human	Mind	on	the	Principles	of	Common	Sense	(1764),	Thomas	Reid	stressed	the	‘original
and	natural	judgments’	of	the	senses	which,	he	argued,	are	‘part	of	that	furniture	which	nature	hath	given	to	the
human	understanding’	(Reid	1997:	215,	emphasis	added).	Like	Malebranche	and	Hume	before	him,	Reid	argued
that	these	natural	judgments	of	sense	incorporate	a	belief	in	the	existence	of	the	external	object,	and	‘of	its	figure,
distance,	and	magnitude’.	Like	them,	he	stressed	that	‘this	judgment	or	belief	is	not	got	by	comparing	ideas’,	that	is,
by	judgment	and	reason	in	the	traditional	sense.	But	while	Malebranche	(1997:	572–4,	34ff.)	and	Hume	(1978:
194ff.)	attributed	such	natural	judgments	to	the	imagination	and	stressed	the	false	assumptions	embodied	in	the
mechanisms	which	produced	them,	Reid	dismissed	such	mechanisms	and	argued	that	these	natural	judgments
emerge	full	blown	as	‘the	common	sense	of	mankind’.	For	Reid,	there	is	no	conflict	between	common	sense	and
science.	He	argued	against	the	view	of	Malebranche	and	Locke	that	we	naturally	ascribe	the	sensations	of	colour,
sound,	smell	to	the	object	and	that	philosophy	is	needed	to	correct	these	mistakes	of	common	sense	(Reid	1997:
72–6;	see	Wright	2005,	esp.	154–6).	For	Reid,	the	understanding	includes	‘first	principles	of	contingent	truths’
which	constitute	both	the	common	sense	of	mankind	and	the	unquestioned	and	true	assumptions	on	which	natural
and	moral	science	must	proceed	(Reid	2002:	467–90).	For	Reid,	there	are	no	conflicts	in	human	understanding.
7.4	Conceiving	the	Limits	of	Human	Understanding
The	aim	of	Locke’s	Essay	was	to	examine	our	‘own	Abilities’	in	order	to	see	‘what	Objects	our	Understandings
were,	or	were	not	fitted	to	deal	with’	(Locke	1975:	‘Epistle	to	the	Reader’	7).	He	argued	that	‘the	Comprehension	of
our	Understandings…comes	exceeding	short	of	the	vast	Extent	of	Things’	(Locke	1975:	I.i.5).	What	lies	on	the
other	side	of	the	comprehension	of	our	understandings	is	probability.	In	most	areas	of	life	we	are	only	guided	by
the	‘Candle-light’	of	probability,	and	lack	the	sunlight	of	perfect	knowledge.	In	making	such	claims,	Locke	considers
the	understanding	to	be	the	faculty	of	absolute	knowledge,	that	knowledge	which	is	gained	primarily	through
intuition	and	demonstration.	It	is	the	faculty	through	which	we	comprehend	and	have	insight	into	the	real	relations
of	things.
We	can,	according	to	Locke,	have	such	comprehension	and	insight	in	a	few	areas	of	human	enquiry,	most
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obviously,	mathematics.	We	have	‘certain	and	universal	Knowledge’	that	the	sum	of	the	angles	of	a	triangle	are
necessarily	equal	to	two	right	angles;	the	connection	between	these	two	ideas	cannot	‘be	possibly	mutable,	or…
depend	on	any	arbitrary	Power’	whatsoever—including	the	will	of	the	Creator	(Locke	1975:	IV.iii.29).	Locke	holds
that,	like	mathematics,	morality	is	capable	of	demonstration—though	he	only	attempts	a	few	steps	toward	showing
that	it	is	so	(Locke	1975:	III.xi.16;	IV.iii.18;	IV.iv.7;	see	Coleman	1983,	and	the	Introduction	to	Fuller,	Stecker,	and
Wright	2000:	esp.	13–22).	In	the	Essay,	Locke	also	gave	a	demonstrative	proof	of	the	existence	of	an	intelligent
eternal	Creator	of	the	universe,	beginning	with	such	intuitive	principles	as	that	we	ourselves	exist,	that	something
cannot	be	derived	from	nothing,	and	that	intelligence	cannot	arise	from	that	which	lacks	it	(Locke	1975:	IV.x,	esp.
2–5).	He	thinks	that	the	fact	‘that	the	size,	figure,	motion	of	one	Body	should	cause	a	change	in	the	size,	figure,
motion	of	another	Body,	is	not	beyond	our	Conception’	and	that	‘the	separation	of	the	Parts	of	one	Body,	upon	the
intrusion	of	another;	and	the	change	from	rest	to	motion,	upon	impulse	…	and	the	like,	seem	to	us	to	have	some
connexion	one	with	another’	(Locke	1975:	IV.iii.13).
But	we	lack	comprehension	of	the	real	essence	of	natural	substances—the	kind	of	demonstrative	knowledge	of
nature	sought	by	Aristotelian	science.	Locke	writes	that	in	the	case	of	natural	substances	‘Experience	must	teach
me,	what	Reason	cannot’	(Locke	1975:	IV.xii.9).	We	need	to	go	out	and	find	what	qualities	coexist	with	other	ones.
For	example,	we	discover	through	experience	that	the	qualities	which	cohere	in	that	substance	we	call	gold
coexist	with	the	quality	of	solubility	in	aqua	regia,	and	so	add	the	latter	quality	to	our	idea	of	the	nominal	essence
of	gold.	However,	this	does	not	provide	us	with	any	universal	knowledge.	Locke	writes	that	since	we	cannot	find
any	necessary	connection	between	a	body	which	has	the	other	properties	of	gold	and	its	incombustibility	we	must
turn	to	experience,	and	that	‘as	far	as	that	reaches,	I	may	have	certain	Knowledge,	but	no	farther’.
Locke	dwells	on	two	major	reasons	for	the	limits	of	our	understanding.	First,	our	lack	of	ideas	which,	he	argues,
must	all	arise	from	sensation	or	reflection.	The	senses	only	provide	us	with	‘dull	and	narrow	Information’	regarding
external	objects	and	fall	‘far	short	of	what	we	may	justly	imagine	to	be	in	some	even	created	understandings’
(Locke	1975:	IV.iii.6).	Secondly,	it	is	impossible	for	us	to	discover	by	either	intuition	or	demonstration	the
agreements	and	disagreements	between	many	of	the	ideas	we	have.	Locke	specifically	points	out	our	inability	to
determine	from	our	ideas	of	thought	and	matter	whether	it	is	possible	for	matter	to	think.	Also	we	are	unable	to
determine	the	necessary	connection	between	primary	and	secondary	qualities	and,	as	we	have	seen,	that
between	any	of	the	qualities	of	natural	substances.
The	realm	of	probability	for	Locke	is	contrasted	to	that	of	knowledge	and	is	excluded	from	the	understanding.
Probability	‘is	nothing	but	the	appearance	of…an	Agreement,	or	Disagreement,	by	the	intervention	of	Proofs	[i.e.
intermediate	ideas]	whose	connexion	is	not	constant	and	immutable,	or	at	least	is	not	perceived	to	be	so…’	(Locke
1975:	IV.xv.1).	In	the	case	of	probability,	‘that	which	makes	me	believe,	is	something	extraneous	to	the	thing	I
believe’—such	as	the	testimony	of	others	and	the	conformity	of	my	current	observation	with	my	own	experience
and	that	of	others	(Locke	1975:	IV.xv.3).	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Locke	takes	very	seriously	the	realm
of	probability	and	opinion,	and	sets	out	normative	rules	according	to	which	we	ought	to	assent	to	different	degrees
of	probability	(Locke	1975:	IV.xvi).	Yet	for	purposes	of	determining	the	limits	of	human	knowledge	it	lies	outside	the
comprehension	of	the	understanding.
It	is	also	important	to	realize	that	in	setting	the	limits	of	our	understanding	and	then	going	on	to	explain	the	rational
grounds	of	opinion	Locke	saw	himself	as	combating	both	relativism	and	scepticism—that	is,	from	concluding	either
that	‘there	is	no	such	thing	as	Truth	at	all;	or	that	Mankind	hath	no	sufficient	means	to	attain…Knowledge	of	it.
(Locke	1975:	I.i.2).	The	central	concerns	which	lay	behind	his	writings	on	‘the	understanding’	were	the	interminable
religious	and	political	disputes	of	late	seventeenth-	and	early	eighteenth-century	England.	He	wrote	that	when	men
‘extend	their	Enquiries	beyond	their	Capacities…they	raise	Questions,	and	multiply	Disputes,	which	never	coming
to	any	clear	Resolution,	are	proper	only	to	continue	and	increase	their	Doubts,	and	confirm	them	at	last	in	perfect
Scepticism’	(Locke	1975:	I.i.7).	Part	of	his	solution	to	scepticism	was	to	show	the	extent	of	human	knowledge;	that
is,	to	find	‘the	Horizon…between	the	enlightened	and	dark	Parts	of	things;	between	what	is,	and	what	is	not
comprehensible	by	us…’	He	thought	that	we	need	to	recognize	the	limits	of	our	comprehension	of	reality	and	so
not	overreach	ourselves	in	claiming	knowledge	where	we	do	not	have	it.
Unlike	Locke,	Hume	identified	the	project	of	showing	the	restrictions	of	human	understanding	as	sceptical.	In	his
Abstract	of	a	Treatise	of	Human	Nature	(1740)	he	wrote	that	his	‘reader	will	easily	perceive,	that	the	philosophy
contain’d	in	this	book	is	very	sceptical,	and	tends	to	give	us	a	notion	of	the	imperfections	and	narrow	limits	of
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human	understanding’	(Hume	1978:	657).	Throughout	his	Enquiry	Concerning	Human	Understanding	Hume	writes
of	the	‘narrow	capacity’	or	‘narrow…bounds	of	human	understanding’	(Hume	2000:	120,	7).	The	academic
philosophy	or	mitigated	scepticism	which	he	adopts	in	that	book	confines	‘to	very	narrow	bounds	the	enquiries	of
the	understanding’	(Hume	2000:	35).
Like	Locke,	Hume	held	that	a	major	source	of	the	limitations	of	our	understandings	was	the	limitations	of	the	ideas
which	we	receive	through	our	inner	and	outer	senses.	All	simple	ideas	are	derived	from	simple	impressions,
whether	of	sensation	or	reflection.	Our	complex	ideas	are	formed	from	those	simple	ideas	by	‘compounding,
transposing,	augmenting,	or	diminishing	the	materials	afforded	us	by	the	senses	and	experience’	(Hume	2000:	14).
We	have	no	objective	idea	of	power,	force,	or	necessary	connection	(words	which	he	considers	more	or	less
synonymous)	and	the	subjective	idea	which	we	do	have	arises	simply	from	constant	experience,	custom	and	the
mechanisms	of	the	imagination.	In	the	Treatise,	he	writes	of	the	lack	of	an	‘adequate	idea’	of	power	in	the	realms	of
either	matter	or	mind	(Hume	1978:	160),	and	in	the	first	Enquiry	that	the	ideas	we	have	of	cause	and	effect	in
either	realm	are	‘so	imperfect…that	it	is	impossible	to	give	any	just	definition	of	cause,	except	what	is	drawn	from
something	extraneous	and	foreign	to	it’	(Hume	2000:	60).	We	fail	to	find	the	necessary	connection	that	we	all
naturally	believe	that	there	is	between	cause	and	effect	so	that	‘we	cannot	give	a	satisfactory	reason,	why	we
believe,	after	a	thousand	experiments,	that	a	stone	will	fall	or	fire	burn’,	much	less	form	any	‘determination…with
regard	to	the	origin	of	worlds,	and	the	situation	of	nature,	to	and	from	eternity’	(Hume	2000:	121).	Hume	goes	on	to
limit	demonstrations	to	the	realm	of	mathematics,	and	proposes	to	throw	any	book	into	the	flames,	if	it	lacks	either
demonstrative	reasoning	or	‘experimental	reasoning	concerning	matters	of	fact	and	existence’	(Hume	2000:
123).
7.5	British	Innatism	and	the	Restriction	of	‘the	Understanding’:	Universal	Ideas,	Necessary	Truths,
and	Non-sensory	Conceptions
Long	before	Dugald	Stewart,	a	number	of	eighteenth-century	British	writers	sought	to	distinguish	the	faculty	of
understanding	from	that	of	the	senses	and	imagination.	While	they	did	not	respond	directly	to	Locke’s	critique	of
innate	ideas	and	principles	in	Book	1	of	the	Essay	Concerning	Human	Understanding,	they	still	insisted—against
both	Locke	and	Hume—that	there	were	ideas	whose	content	does	not	derive	from	experience.	The	overall	view
that	emerged	from	these	writings	was	that	while	the	senses	provide	an	occasion	for	the	development	of	the	ideas
of	the	understanding,	they	do	not	supply	their	content.
In	Two	dissertations	concerning	sense	and	imagination…	(1728)	Zachary	Mayne	argued	that	the	proper	object	of
the	understanding	is	what	he	called	a	‘Notion’,	not	an	idea	as	that	term	has	been	understood	since	the	time	of
Locke.	Locke	had	instituted	a	‘new	Doctrine’	when	he	claimed	‘that	the	Perception	of	an	Idea	is	an	Act	of
Understanding’	(Mayne	1728:	105).	Since	publication	of	An	Essay	Concerning	Human	Understanding,people	have
generally	used	the	word	‘idea’	for	‘the	Image,	Picture,	or	Representation	in	the	Mind	of	a	Sensible	Appearance,	or
of	an	Object	which	hath	before	been	perceived	by	Sense’	(Mayne	1728:	104).	Mayne	does	not	seek	to	correct	this
usage,	as	do	the	other	writers	we	shall	look	at	in	this	section,	but	he	thinks	that	it	encourages	people	to	think	that
they	actually	see	or	perceive	what	can	only	be	understood.	He	wrote	that	people	‘fancy	they	see	what	they
understand,	or	see	the	Intelligibility…of	an	Object,	which	is…only	perceivable	or	discernible	by	the
Understanding	and	does	in	no	wise	fall	under	the	Notice	and	Cognisance	of	Sense’	(Mayne	1728:	14).	His	central
point	is	that	the	sensory	properties	of	a	thing	do	not	tell	us	how	a	thing	is	related	to	other	things	and	that	its
relations	are	only	intelligible	through	the	understanding.
In	his	Hermes:	or	a	Philosophical	Inquiry	Concerning	Language	and	Universal	Grammar	(1751),	James	Harris
speculated	that	‘the	English	word,	UNDERSTANDING’	was	originally	coined	to	stand	for	that	faculty	where
permanent	knowledge	was	supposed	to	reside	(Harris	1751:	371).	The	understanding	was	supposed	to	‘STAND
UNDER’	the	sciences	‘as	their	immoveable	support’.	It	should	not	be	considered	to	embrace	‘fleeting	powers	of
perception,	like	the	Sense[s]​,	but…steady,	permanent,	and	durable	COMPREHENSIONS’.
According	to	the	Platonism	developed	in	Harris’s	book,	the	ideas	of	the	understanding	are	universal	and	not
‘circumscribed	either	by	Time	or	Place’	(Harris	1751:	381).	Unlike	the	objects	of	the	senses	they	are	not	fleeting	or
impermanent,	but	originally	exist	as	permanent	possibilities	contained	in	the	mind	of	the	creator.	Sensations	are	no
more	than	‘passing	pictures	of	these	immutable	Archetypes’	(Harris	1751:	384).	Harris	considers	the	view	of
Locke	that	general	ideas	are	derived	from	the	ideas	of	sensory	particulars	as	‘a	kind	of	Atheism’,	because	it	implies
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that	the	mind	can	be	affected	by	the	body	(Harris	1751:	400).	It	is	true	that	the	senses	‘awaken	the	dormant
energies	of	Man’s	Understanding’	(Harris	1751:	394).	But	sensation	is	only	like	the	spark	which	is	needed	to	fire	a
cannon;	it	does	not	contain	‘those	Energies	themselves’	which	are	released	when	we	understand.	To	avoid
atheism	one	must	trace	all	ideas,	those	of	human	beings	as	well	as	those	of	the	creator,	to	a	purely	mental	source.
In	the	final	analysis	Harris	considers	all	minds	either	to	be	themselves	divine	or	to	derive	their	ideas	from	the	one
single	mind	of	the	creator.
Harris	regarded	the	imagination	as	an	intermediate	faculty	which	prepares	the	way	for	the	universal	ideas	which
are	comprehended	by	the	understanding.	While	sensation	limits	us	to	the	present,	imagination	supplies	human
beings	with	‘permanent	Phantasms’	on	which	the	mind	can	operate	(Harris	1751:	360).	Nevertheless,	imagination
only	provides	the	basis	for	the	operation	of	the	faculty	of	understanding	which	‘discerns…what	in	MANY	IS	ONE’
and	‘comes	to	behold	a	kind	of	superior	Objects’—namely	‘GENERAL	IDEAS’	(Harris	1751:	362–3).
Like	Harris,	Richard	Price,	in	his	Review	of	the	Principle	Questions	of	Morals	(1758),	held	that	‘the	very	notion	of
sense	and	understanding	are,	in	all	respects,	different’	(Price	1758:	25).	While	sense	is	‘conversant	only	about
particulars’	the	understanding	has	universals	for	its	object.	He	took	issue	with	the	Lockean	claim	that	abstract
ideas	are	formed	from	particular	ones	which	exist	previously	in	the	understanding.	We	must,	he	argued,	already
have	the	general	idea	of	a	triangle	in	our	understandings	in	order	to	discover	what	particular	triangles	of	different
sizes	and	angles	have	in	common.	‘How	else	should…[the	understanding]	know	how	to	go	to	work,	or	what	to
reflect	on?’	(Price	1758:	42)	Price	also	takes	issue	with	the	claim	embraced	by	Berkeley	and	Hume	that	universality
consists	in	a	name	which	is	used	to	signify	only	particular	ideas. 	For,	if	‘the	idea	to	which	the	name	answers	and
which	it	recalls	into	the	mind…[is]	only	a	particular	one,	we	could	not	know	to	what	other	ideas	to	apply	it,	or	what
particular	objects	had	the	resemblance	necessary	to	bring	them	within	the	meaning	of	the	name’	(Price	1769:	38).
Price	stressed	the	distinction	between	the	understanding	and	imagination	as	well	as	that	between	the
understanding	and	the	senses.	He	acknowledged	that	we	need	to	imagine	the	figure	of	a	particular	triangle	when
we	perform	a	geometrical	proof,	but	the	proof	could	not	be	applied	generally	if	we	had	‘none	but	particular	ideas’
(Price	1758:	43).	Moreover,	if	the	understanding	were	not	distinct	from	the	imagination	one	could	not	distinguish	the
primary	and	real	properties	of	matter	from	secondary	ones.	For,	if	our	ideas	were	limited	to	those	of	imagination,	we
could	never	be	able	to	represent	matter	without	colour.	Because	the	understanding	can	conceive	abstract	ideas
which	have	never	been	sensed,	it	is	able	to	pronounce	‘without	doubt	or	hesitation,	that	colour	being	no	quality	of
matter,	it	does	and	must	exist	without	it’	(Price	1758:	45).
For	Price,	the	understanding	is	simply	the	faculty	in	the	mind	‘that	discerns	truth,	that	views,	compares,	and	judges
of	all	ideas	and	things’	(Price	1758:	19–20).	He	argues	that	this	faculty,	as	it	operates	through	‘Intuition’	is	the
source	of	new	simple	ideas	which	cannot	be	derived	from	sensation	and	reflection.	It	‘is	a	spring	of	new	ideas’.	In
intuition,	the	understanding	forms	these	ideas	at	the	same	time	as	it	discovers	fundamental	truths	about	the	nature
of	reality.
Price	stressed	that	the	understanding,	unlike	the	senses,	is	active	in	the	pursuit	of	knowledge.	The	senses	are
passive,	their	impressions	and	ideas	arising	independently	of	our	wills.	They	know	nothing	of	the	objects	which
cause	these	impressions.	He	argues	that	the	senses	are	bound	up	with	the	material	part	of	our	being.	However,	‘in
intellectual	perceptions,	the	soul	acts	more	by	itself,	and	separately	from	matter’	(Price	1758:	23).	It	is	‘the	intellect
that	must	perceive…order	and	proportion;	variety	and	regularity,	design,	connection,	art,	and	power…’	(Price
1758:	24).
Among	the	ideas	which	Price	ascribes	to	the	understanding	are	solidity,	inertia,	duration,	space	and	time,	and
infinity.	According	to	Price,	in	apprehending	these	ideas	we	apprehend	necessary	self-evident	truths	about	reality.
In	apprehending	the	idea	of	solidity	we	understand	that	two	solid	objects	cannot	occupy	the	same	space.	Such	an
idea	cannot	arise	from	experience;	indeed,	Price	argues	that	there	are	cases	where	two	distinct	bodies	appear	to
run	into	each	other.	His	account	of	solidity	is	directly	opposed	to	that	of	Locke,	who	argued	that	we	get	the	idea	of
the	impenetrability	of	solid	bodies	from	the	sense	of	touch	(Price	1758:	26–7;	cf.	Locke	1975:	II.iv).	Price	holds	that
the	impenetrability	of	bodies	is	a	necessary	and	universal	truth,	and	that	such	a	truth	cannot	be	derived	from	the
senses.	The	senses	can	only	tell	us	what	happens	in	finite	particular	cases.
Price	appeals	to	the	ideas	of	the	understanding	to	support	controversial	views	in	eighteenth-century	natural
philosophy	and	natural	theology	such	as	the	claim	that	matter	is	inactive.	He	asks	the	question	‘what	furnishes	us
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with	our	ideas	of	resistance	and	inactivity?’	He	asserts	that	it	cannot	be	experience	because
never	did	any	man	yet	see	any	portion	of	matter	that	was	void	of	gravity,	and	many	other	active	powers;
or	that	would	not	immediately	quit	its	state	of	rest	and	begin	to	move;	and	also	lose	or	acquire	motion	after
the	impressing	of	new	force	upon	it,	without	any	visible	or	discoverable	cause.	(Price	1758:	28–9)
His	point	is	that	the	appearances	suggest	principles	which	go	against	those	known	to	be	necessary	by	appeal	to
intuition.	Matter	appears	to	move	spontaneously	when	attracted	to	another	body;	but	the	contrary	claim	that	matter
is	devoid	of	any	activity	is	intuitive	and	a	priori.	His	view	of	the	inertness	of	matter	is	directly	opposed	to	those	of
David	Hume	and,	Henry	Home,	Lord	Kames. 	In	his	Philosophical	Essays	Concerning	Human	Understanding,
Hume	argued	that	one	cannot	determine	a	priori	that	matter	is	devoid	of	activity.	He	asked	rhetorically	if	it	is	‘more
difficult	to	conceive,	that	motion	may	arise	from	impulse,	than	that	it	may	arise	from	volition?’,	and	went	on	in	a
footnote	to	the	first	edition	of	this	book	to	commend	Newton	for	putting	forward	the	hypothesis	of	‘an	aetherial
active	matter’	to	explain	universal	attraction. 	For	Hume,	not	only	is	the	principle	that	matter	is	inactive	not
intuitive;	it	might	be	false.	Only	further	experience	can	decide	the	issue.
Another	simple	idea	which	Price	attributes	to	the	understanding	is	duration.	He	agrees	with	Hume	that	all	we	directly
observe	is	a	succession	of	perceptions:	‘What	the	observation	of	the	train	of	thoughts	following	one	another	in	our
minds,	or	the	constant	flux	of	external	things,	immediately	and	properly	suggests	to	us	is	succession’	(Price	1758:
30).	But	while	a	lasting	object	cannot	be	directly	observed,	the	idea	of	duration	is	‘included	in	every	notion	we	can
frame	of	reality	and	existence’.	Again	there	is	a	direct	contrast	with	the	views	of	Hume,	who	argued	that	we	believe
in	duration	as	a	result	of	a	‘fiction’	of	the	imagination	through	which	we	conflate	an	unchanging	perception	with	a
successive	one	(Hume	1978:	37).
Price	also	claims	in	opposition	to	Hume	that	the	causal	maxim—the	belief	that	every	event	has	a	cause—can	be
established	by	intuition.	It	is	‘an	essential	principle,	a	primary	perception	of	the	understanding’	(Price	1758:	34–5).
He	writes	that	nothing	could	be	‘more	clearly	absurd	and	contradictory,	than	the	notion	of	a	change	without	a
changer;…or	beginning	to	exist	without	being	produced’.	For	Price,	an	uncaused	event	seems	to	be	a	conceptual
impossibility,	though	he	does,	briefly,	like	later	Scottish	writers,	refer	the	principle	to	‘common	sense’.	He
disregards	Hume’s	argument	that	the	idea	of	a	beginning	of	existence	and	having	a	cause	are	two	entirely	distinct
ideas,	and	that	we	can	conceive	of	the	first	without	the	second	(Hume	1978:	79–80).	He	also	dismisses	Kames’s
claim	that	the	causal	maxim	can	be	derived	from	feeling	(see	Home	1751:	271–6),	saying	that	anyone	who
ascribes	the	principle	‘to	a	different	power	from	the	understanding,	should	inform	us	why	the	same	should	not	be
asserted	of	all	self-evident	truth	and	impossibility’	(Price	1758:	35–6).
Price	argues	that	the	idea	of	power,	both	active	and	passive,	must	have	its	source	in	the	understanding.	It	is,	he
claims,	inconceivable	that	there	could	exist	a	real	object	which	is	neither	productive	of	change	nor	be	changed	by
something	else.	He	asserts	that	‘all	the	foundations	of	natural	knowledge…would	be	destroyed’	if	‘all	things	[were]
wholly	unconnected,	loose,	and	detached	from	one	another’	so	that	‘one	event	or	object’	did	not	‘in	any
circumstances	imply	any	thing…beyond	itself’	(Price	1758:	37).	Everyone	admits	that	‘things	appear	otherwise	to
us’	and	that	‘we	are	under	a	necessity	of	considering	them	as	connected	and	of	inferring	one	thing	from	another’.
But	without	refuting	Hume’s	argument	that	this	supposition	arises	from	the	imagination,	Price	asks	why	it	should	not
be	accounted	for	by	a	real	connection	perceivable	by	reason.
Price	holds	that	we	are	always	dissatisfied	with	an	explanation	unless	we	discover	a	necessary	connection
between	cause	and	effect.	We	are	not	satisfied	when	‘we	only	see	one	thing	constantly	attending,	or	following
another,	without	perceiving	the	real	dependence	and	connexion’	(Price	1758:	38).	This	is	the	case	with	gravitation,
as	well	as	the	regular	connection	between	impressions	on	our	body	and	the	sensations	which	attend	them.	In	each
of	these	cases	we	are	aware	that	we	have	not	yet	discovered	the	power	by	which	the	cause	produces	the	effect.
He	mentions	Newton’s	three	original	laws	of	motion,	as	cases	where	(he	thinks)	we	do	have	an	understanding	of
the	necessary	connection	between	causes	and	effects.	He	is	confident	that	‘had	we	a	perfect	insight	into	the
constitution	of	nature,	the	laws	that	govern	it,	and	the	motions,	texture,	and	relations	of	the	several	bodies…that
compose	it;	the	whole	chain	of	future	events	in	it	would	be	laid	open	to	us’	(Price	1758:	39–40).	In	this	case	we
would	have	no	more	use	for	experience	and	observation.
According	to	Price,	the	regularity	of	experience	is	only	a	sign	of	some	underlying	cause.	To	illustrate	this	he
appeals	to	a	thought	experiment	where	one	side	of	a	regular	six	sided	die	turns	up	on	every	throw.	In	such	a	case
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he	thinks	that	we	would	all	conclude	that	‘there	was	something	in	the	constitution	of	it	that	disposed	it	to	turn	up	this
particular	side,	rather	than	any	other’	(Price	1758:	40	note).	The	same	is	true	of	any	other	experienced	regularity,
where	we	are	unable	to	understand	the	necessity	underlying	the	regularity.
While	philosophers	of	the	Scottish	school	of	‘common	sense’	tended	to	avoid	the	word	‘idea’	which	they
associated	with	the	view	that	ideas	constitute	a	third	entity	between	the	mind	and	the	external	object,	they	did	hold
that	we	have	non-sensory	conceptions	or	notions	of	external	objects.	Thomas	Reid	wrote	in	his	Inquiry	‘that	we
have	clear	and	distinct	conceptions	of	extension,	figure,	motion,	and	other	attributes	of	body,	which	are	neither
sensations,	nor	like	any	sensation,	is	a	fact	of	which	we	may	be	as	certain	as	that	we	have	sensations’	(Reid	1997:
76).	Like	Harris,	he	holds	that	while	such	conceptions	are	occasioned	by	sensations,	they	are	products	of	the	mind
itself.	Often,	according	to	Reid,	we	are	not	even	aware	of	the	sensation:	in	his	discussion	of	the	sense	of	touch	he
wrote	that	the	feelings	of	touch	serve	as	‘natural	signs’	from	which	‘the	mind	immediately	passes	to	the	thing
signified,	without	making	the	least	reflection	upon	the	sign,	or	observing	that	there	was	any	such	thing’	(Reid	1997:
63).	Following	Berkeley,	Reid’s	word	for	the	relation	between	the	sensation	and	the	conception	it	occasions	is
‘suggestion’.	He	writes	that	even	when	we	have	never	before	‘had	any	notion	or	conception	of	the	things	signified’
the	sensations	as	natural	signs	‘do	suggest	it,	or	conjure	it	up	by	a	kind	of	natural	magic,	and	at	once	give	us	a
conception	or	belief	in	it’	(Reid	1997:	60).	However,	unlike	the	suggested	ideas	of	Berkeley’s	philosophy,	those	of
Reid	do	not	arise	from	experience,	but	rather	from	the	native	constitution	of	the	understanding.
Unlike	Harris	and	Price,	Reid	took	the	non-sensory	conceptions	which	were	occasioned	by	our	sensations,	to	be
particular	qualities	of	external	objects—not	universals.	On	Reid’s	view	we	immediately	apprehend	particular
external	objects	and	their	properties	such	as	hardness.	Nevertheless,	he	did	praise	James	Harris	and	James	Burnet,
Lord	Monboddo,	for	restoring	the	word	‘idea’	to	its	ancient	meaning,	where	it	referred	only	to	universals	(Reid
2002:	387). 	Reid’s	sometime	Aberdeen	colleague,	George	Campbell,	wrote	in	his	Philosophy	of	Rhetoric	of	1776
that	it	is	only	‘general	notions	or	abstract	ideas…which	are	considered	as	particularly	the	object	of	the
understanding’	(Campbell	1776:	Vol.	1,	104n)—a	view	which	he	shared	with	Harris,	Price,	and	Monboddo.
7.6	Conclusion:	Reconceiving	‘The	Understanding’	and	Eliminating	Scepticism
In	the	Introduction	to	his	Treatise	on	the	Principles	of	Human	Knowledge	(1709)	Berkeley	noted	that	the	source	of
scepticism	was	thought	to	be	‘the	natural	weakness	and	imperfection	of	our	understandings’	(Berkeley	1949:	25–6
(§§2–3)).	He	himself	argued	that	scepticism	does	not	arise	from	the	failure	of	our	natural	faculties	but	rather	in	‘the
wrong	use	we	make	of	them’.	More	specifically,	he	argued	that	scepticism	has	its	roots	in	the	belief	in	the	existence
of	objects	independent	of	the	mind	which	cause	and	correspond	to	our	ideas.	His	solution	to	scepticism,	developed
in	Part	I	of	the	Principles,	was	to	deny	the	existence,	as	well	as	the	conceivability,	of	such	objects	(Berkeley	1949:
48–9,	78–80	(§§18–20,	86–9)).	However,	few	eighteenth-century	philosophers	accepted	this	solution.	As	Hume
observed	after	explaining	one	of	Berkeley’s	strongest	arguments	against	the	existence	of	matter,	‘his	arguments,
though	otherwise	intended,	are,	in	reality,	merely	sceptical’	in	so	far	as	‘they	admit	of	no	answer	and	produce	no
conviction’	(Hume	2000:	116	note).
Writers	later	in	the	century	including	Price	and	Reid	also	saw	themselves	as	defending	human	understanding	from
sceptical	objections.	They	rejected	the	experiential	origin	of	our	ideas	which	Berkeley	shared	with	Locke	and
Hume,	and	claimed	that	our	basic	beliefs	such	as	those	in	an	external	world	independent	of	our	senses	arose	from
a	set	of	ideas	which	had	their	source	in	the	understanding	alone.	These	ideas	were,	according	to	these	writers,	the
source	of	truths	which	were	intuitively	certain.	As	we	have	seen,	Price	considered	these	truths	to	be	necessary
and	their	denials	to	be	self-contradictions.	However,	for	Reid,	not	all	these	truths	were	necessary,	though	he	held
that	it	was	absurd	to	deny	even	the	first	principles	of	contingent	judgments.	Their	authority	lay	in	their	innateness,
and	the	fact	that	their	denials	went	against	the	dictates	of	common	sense	(see	Harris	2008).
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Notes:
( )	For	the	importance	of	Locke’s	writings	in	the	development	of	faculty	psychology	in	the	eighteenth	century,	see
Buickerood	(1985).	On	faculty	psychology	throughout	the	seventeenth	century,	see	Hatfield	(1998).
( )	Winkler	(2006)	stresses	the	distinction	between	‘verdictive’	and	‘perceptive’	models	of	judgment,	but	ends	up
noting	that	many	eighteenth	century	philosophers	and	logicians	combined	both	models.
( )	Perhaps	the	two	views	are	reconcilable	if	one	interprets	Locke	as	holding	that	liberty	is	compatible	with
necessity.	On	the	difficult	question	of	whether	Locke	is	a	compatibilist,	see	Chappell	1998,	esp.	p.	89.
( )	The	name	of	the	Philosophical	Essays	Concerning	Human	Understanding	was	changed	by	Hume	to	An	Enquiry
Concerning	Human	Understanding	in	1758.
( )	This	note	was	dropped	after	the	first	two	editions	of	the	Philosophical	Essays.	See	Hume	2000:	232.	For
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Hutcheson’s	distinction	between	the	faculty	of	reason	and	moral	sense,	see	Hutcheson	2002:	137–55.
( )	Duncan	(1748)	also	includes	the	fourfold	division	of	the	acts	of	the	understanding.
( )	See	also	Locke	1975:	4.21.4,	where	Locke	gives	his	‘Division	of	the	Sciences’.
( )	It	was	this	observation	which	led	to	the	famous	problem	formulated	by	William	Molyneux,	which	Locke	reported
in	his	Essay—the	problem	of	whether	a	person	born	blind	who	gained	his	sight	when	he	was	an	adult	would	be
able,	without	further	experience,	to	distinguish	a	cube	from	a	sphere	by	sight.	Both	Molyneux	and	Locke	denied
that	this	was	possible.
( )	This	explanation	was	developed	in	a	very	convincing	way	by	Dugald	Stewart.	See	Stewart	1792–1827:	Vol.	1,
103–31.
( )	‘All	kinds	of	reasoning	consist	in	nothing	but	a	comparison,	and	a	discovery	of	those	relations,	either	constant
or	inconstant,	which	two	or	more	objects	bear	to	each	other’	(Hume	1978:	73).
( )	Hume	acknowledged	an	ambiguity	in	his	use	of	the	term	imagination	in	a	footnote	which	he	first	added	to	Hume
1978:	371	and	then	revised	and	moved	to	117.	It	would	take	me	too	far	afield	to	discuss	these	notes	here.	The
point	I	am	making	is	that	he	fails	to	acknowledge	that	he	also	uses	the	terms	‘understanding’	and	‘reasoning’	in	two
very	different	senses.
( )	See	Berkeley	1949,	Introduction;	and	Hume	1978:	1.1.7,	17–25.
( )	For	Home	on	the	inertness	of	matter,	see	Home	1754.
( )	This	was	changed	to	‘etherial	active	fluid’	in	the	third	edition	of	1756	as	a	result	of	the	criticism	of	John	Stewart,
Professor	of	Natural	Philosophy	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh.	See	Hume	2000:	57–8n.	16,	and	Beachamp	2000:
lxxviii–lxxix,	157–8.	See	also	Wright	1983:	162–4.
( )	Reid	refers	to	Burnett	[Lord	Monboddo]	1779–99:	I,	ch.	1,	as	well	as	Harris	1751:	book	III,	ch.	4.
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